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Abstract 
This paper has a clear objective. To reflect about the question: Is the Social Europe fit for glo-
balization?  This reflection will be organized in three parts. In first we present the institutional 
framework of reference: The Welfare State. In the second we try to offer a panoramic about the Wel-
fare State in the European Union across the time. We deal with the concept of European Social model 
and with the social statistics of the different Member States in the E.U. We try to answer to another in-
termediate question: do exist really the European Social Model? 
The third part of the paper we deal with the main question: the Social Europe and the globaliza-
tion challenge. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 The work whose introduction we are about to start is to offer a general view of the 
current situation of the Welfare States in the countries of the European Union, outlining the 
characteristics of the so-called European Social Model. This fortunate term was first sug-
gested by Jacques Delors during the 80’s on the twentieth century in order to distinguish the 
typical features of the European social policies from the States’ model.   
The enlargement of the European Union up to 27 countries has marked a historical mi-
lestone which has significantly changed the processes of divergence between Member 
States, originally expressed as a goal with no deadline. Its economics aspects were later spe-
cified in the Treaty of Maastricht, which leaded to the Economic and Monetary Union and 
the origin of the Euro as single currency.   Nothing similar has happened at the social field.  
Social policy is a key on the real configuration of the Welfare States and is still a compe-
tence of the Member States. Its approach should be found through the coordination of the 
different national policies.  This Fact brought Ferrera (2000) to describe the field of social 
policy as an “institutional dwarf” in the European Union.  
The study we are introducing will enable the gauging of the great divergence that 
Member States show on welfare spending and its functions. This requires a classification of 
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the Welfare States into different sub models, so that we could better understand the peculi-
arities of the different realities that form this almost unmanageable European Union of 27 
members.  
Además, desde hace más de treinta años, se ha suscitado una crítica al Estado del 
Bienestar como configuración institucional, por considerarlo ineficiente en el exigente 
contexto de la globalización, apareciendo voces que alertan de la esclerosis europea para 
competir en ese nuevo escenario, voces que señalan a los gastos del modelo social como 
responsables de esta falta de dinamismo de las economías europeas frente a otros modelos 
como el de los Estados Unidos o Japón. Moreover, some critics to the welfare state model as 
an institutional arrangement dates back to more than 30 years ago, as it was considered inef-
ficient in the demanding globalization context.  
It is probably true that more catastrophic forecast were laid aside by historical facts and 
also that the current debate about the reorientation of the Welfare State has become more 
pragmatic, or as it was mentioned by Lopez Gandía and Ochando Claramunt (2005, p.9), 
less ideological and theoretical. 
It is a fact that the dismantling of the Welfare State was not carried out in any Euro-
pean country. But some new ways of financing, management and social protection are being 
sought to guarantee the political and economic feasibility of the system and to improve its 
results in terms of efficiency. 
So we found a configuration, consolidation and crisis process that we should analyze to 
finally outline the elements that might be included in the policies that will redefine and pre-
serve this virtuous institutional structure, which for a long period of the recent history 
managed to join efficiency and social cohesion, still current objectives in actual societies.  
We have tackled the stated subjects in the way it is now explained. Firstly we have a 
look having a look to the historical and institutional basis that has contributed to establish 
the Welfare States. Together with the basis we are analyzing which are the main features 
and the pillars of the classical Welfare State, an institutional structure consolidated in the 
1960’s of the twentieth century.  
We have pointed before the critics at this institutional arrangement and its reforming 
tendencies. The fourth section deals with the analysis of the explicative factors of this atti-
tude change faced with the Welfare State in the doctrinal as in the political field.     
The fifth section is the most important one. A general view of the social policy and the 
main elements of the Welfare States in the European Union is there presented.   It begins 
with a classification of the current social models in Europe in four sub models: Nordic, An-
glo-Saxon, Continental and Mediterranean and their main features. Afterwards we outline a 
quantitative approximation using the statistics of Eurostat. Then we carry out the analysis of 
the social spending from different points of view and the financing of the different systems 
of social protection, as they are indexes that synthesize the basic features of the European 
social model.  
The last section is about the challenges that this social model is to face as well as the 
reforms brought up in view of the so announced crisis of the Welfare States.   The study 
ends with the exposition of a series of conclusion as a summary of the main issues. 
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2. THE WELFARE STATE AS AN INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF 
REFERENCE WELFARE STATES’ MAIN FEATURES AND PILLARS  
 
2.1 Main Features 
As a result of the foundations analyzed in previous section, we could distinguish two 
main features of the Welfare State. First we have what Anisi (1989) calls “Keynesian Pact”. 
This pact is based on the fact that economic growth is inclusive in relation with the working 
class. This means, there is an economic growing process in which forced unemployment 
does not appear in the system. Therefore employment creation becomes an essential element 
of the growing process. The tacit nature "pact" comes from the fact that this reality is as-
sumed as an inspiring principle of the social model by workers, business people and the 
State.  
The second main feature does not have an economic nature, but social: a set of mini-
mum social services from the public sector is guaranteed to the citizens.  
Three main pillars hold up the Welfare State from these two main features.  
 
2.2. Three Pillars 
2.2.1. Full Employment  
It is important to highlight the guarantee of full employment from de public sector as 
first pillar and essential part in the arrangement of Welfare States. Keynes’s General Theory 
presented, as we could have seen before, the necessary intellectual arguments for a crucial 
intervention in that moment: to eradicate unemployment blot from the system, the worst 
consequence of the markets’ functioning without the necessary corrections by the public 
sector.  
A Welfare State can not be understood with a high involuntary unemployment, be-
cause it means an intolerable abandonment of the guarantee function the State had.  
Below we focus on the causes of the Welfare State’s crisis and the fact that this pillar 
was the first to weaken by a new theoretical liberal-style paradigm.  
 
2.2.2. Universal and Public Provision of Social Services  
The guarantee of a set of minimum social services provided by public sector is speci-
fied in the universal and public provision of this set of services, from health, education and 
pensions, to the care of dependent people or housing.  
After World War II, Welfare States could be regarded according to the social democrat 
institutional model, distinguished by the universality principle, a wide range of good quality 
social services, a strong influence of the public production of those services and their financ-
ing by means of general taxes (Muñoz de Bustillo, 2000, p.41). It is also true that each 
country has been shaping its own services offer depending of the socioeconomic process of 
development, but not until the 1980s can we talk about an extension process of those servic-
es. This second pillar has been sustained since that moment to the present. In countries like 
Spain which has a later developed Welfare State, the services it includes have enlarged from 
the 1980s. At the beginning of the twenty first century it is observed a light weakening of 
the basic features of this pillar.  
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2.2.3. Alert Faced with Alineation and Poverty: Guarantee of a Minimum Standard of 
Living  
 
This third pillar has been a key element in the configuration of the Welfare States after 
the war. It is about not tolerating alienation and poverty situations that can affect the society 
with unforeseeable consequencesi. Minimum income policies and poverty prevention poli-
cies in its different kinds and causes has become a basic pillar in the classic Welfare State.  
The deep social shifts currently taking place as ageing of population, fragility of famil-
iar structure, boom of migrations… are causing a new outbreak of alienation and poverty 
and past policies are no longer successful. In fact, the number of marginalized and poor 
people has increased, which becomes a challenge for the system’s stability.  
Therefore these three pillars have sustain the Welfare State better or worse since the 
middle of the twentieth century, but now, in the first decade of the twenty first century, they 
seem to be weakening with no remedy and without an equivalent alternative solid model. 
The model which seems to decline is what Bauman (2002, p.16. In Bauman and Tester, 
2002) calls “modern ethics” and “modern order” and leads in his reform to a “post-modern 
order”. The change from one order to the other will be distinguished by:  
“the change from normative regulation to seduction, from political planning to public 
relations, from obligation to advertising. I think that what supports all these changes is the 
fact that centralized and closely administrated bodies that used to be in charge of social inte-
gration have transfer this task to <market strength>, basically unfocussed and with a lack of 
coordination.” 
As Bauman thinks, we are in a post-modern or a “liquid modernity” period, defined as 
“the modernity less its dreams” (Bauman, 2002, p.106. In Bauman and Tester, 2002). In this 
current state of modern disappointment Abunda Bruckner (2003, p.195) states: 
“Civilization creates as much suffering as it relieves. Not only do we feel its rules hard, 
when welfare is set up as a rule, becomes adversity even more unbearable. Modernity does 
not disappoint for its failure but for having too much success”. 
 
3. A GENERAL VIEW TO SOCIAL POLICIES AND WELFARE STATES OF 
THE EUROPEAN UNION  
 
We have been speaking about the Welfare State in general and comparing it to a model 
of homogeneous features that could be recognized in any Member State of the European 
Union.  This styling is just a rough approach to a very diverse and complex reality, moreo-
ver now after the enlargement of Europe. To enrich the vision of the social Europe we could 
start offering a classification of the different Welfare States corresponding to the EU-15 
countries in four social models.  
 
3.1. Four Current Social Models in the European Union 
Boeri (2002) offers the following classification we are setting out.  
 
3.1.1. The Nordic Model (Finland, Sweden and Denmark) 
The Nordic model is characterised by five features. First a wide universal provision of 
public services by the state. Second, it is important to highlight that high level of social pro-
tection is achieved by a high fiscal pressure. Third is highly interventionist on working 
markets. Intervention swings around three axes: a major importance of active policies, a 
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wide use of tax incentives and a high rate of public employment. Fourth, we find high rates 
of activity, both in case of men and women. Some time ago this countries achieved the ac-
tivity rates marked out as objective at the Lisbon Strategy. Fifth, labour markets present 
compressed wage structure which is favourable to social cohesion.  
 
3.1.2. Anglo-Saxon Model (United Kingdom and Ireland)  
This model has been formed in its current features from de so called “new Labour 
Movement” inspired in Giddens’ (1999) third way theory, promoted by Prime Minister Tony 
Blair on the United Kingdom. We could highlight six different features. As for provision of 
social services, Anglo-Saxon model seems to be generous, although it does not present the 
universality feature of the Nordic model. Its basic objective is to guarantee a minimum stan-
dard of living. It is about reducing the impact of some situations that could cause poverty, as 
illness, ageing or unemployment. In this model’s context social contribution is important, 
because they are a key source of funding for the system. On the contrary, fiscal pressure and 
public spending have kept in relatively low levels. Public employment can also be consi-
dered as reduced. Finally we can highlight the relative weakness of trade unions caused by 
Mrs. Thatcher at the conservative revolution period, as well as the important wage disper-
sion in the pay scales.  
 
3.1.3. Continental Model (France, Germany, Belgium, Holland, Luxemburg and Aus-
tria) 
The continental model is the most widespread in the central European countries and it 
is basically based in a social security system, not necessarily linked to employment. This 
model includes a pension system, retirement pensions as well as disability allowance, which 
is really important. The existence of a high welfare spending, leaving a limited role to mar-
ket can be pointed out as main feature that we will se on section 5.3. in more detail. Benefits 
are usually linked to income and are mainly financed by social contributions. Finally we 
have to mention the noteworthy importance of collective bargaining in the structure of la-
bour relations.  
 
3.1.4. Mediterranean Model (Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain) 
This model is visible in south Europe countries and it is characterized by a strong pro-
tective regulation of employment. During the last years a strong encouragement of early 
retirement was observed in labour market. Relatively low unemployment benefits and an 
important segmentation of wage structure are also observed in the context of the labour 
market. Trade unions still have an important influence in labour relations and in collective 
bargaining processes.  
Social spending concentrates on retirement pensions. In contrast, Spending on family 
protection is meagre. Families bear with an extra burden in social protection tasks. In the 
cases of Greece, Portugal and Spain, which come from conservative dictatorships and have a 
short development of the Welfare State, a clear exploitation of women can be added to this 
extra burden (Navarro, 2006). 
Concerning to financing of social protection systems, a slowly substitution of social 
contribution for general taxes, moreover on sanitary systems, can be also observed.  
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3.2. Efficiency and Equality in the European Social Models 
Safir (2005) has classified the four models analyzed before from two variables, effi-
ciency and equity, inherent in all of them. In table 1 we can see that the Nordic model 
presents the best record, as it joins high efficiency and equity. In the cases of Anglo-Saxon 
and continental models a trade-off is produced between equity and efficiency. Incapacity to 
reach simultaneous high records in both variables determines: a commitment for efficiency 
in the Anglo-Saxon case and higher attention to equity in the continental model. The Medi-
terranean model, with low records on efficiency and equity should be widely reformed as it 
presents a clearly negative situation.  
 
Table no. 1 
High Low
High Nordic Continental
Low Anglo-Saxon Mediterranean
Efficiency
Equity
Source: [Sapir (2005)] 
 
3.3. European Social Model Concept  
 
The expression European social model was firstly used in the 1980s by Jacques De-
lors, who was president of the European commission at that time, to identify the main 
features of European policies in contrast to the United State’s model. These policies tried 
with reasonable success to combine economic development and social progress. In this 
sense, a social spending as higher GDP percentage than in other current models in OECD 
countries not from the European Union, with the dispersion we will see now, is observed in 
countries of the European Union. We are going to use some data to outline this characteris-
tic profile of the European social model and the noticeable differences we are going to see 
between Member States.  
 
3.3.1. A Quantitative Aproximation to the European Social Model 
We are going to deal with this quantitative approximation focusing on four vectors: so-
cial spending as a percentage of GDP, the same social spending but per capita in purchasing 
power parity, the functions in which this social spending is distributed, the percentage of the 
total social spending and finally the financing sources of social protection systems.  
 
3.3.1.1. Social Spending as Percentage of GDP (1975-2006) 
Table 2 shows a general view of the evolution of social spending in some countries of 
the UE-27. The period included goes from 1975 to 2006, except for the countries having 
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joined the EU later. In this way, Portugal shows data from 1995 and from the countries of 
the 2004 and 2007 enlargements we only have data from the year 2000.    
                                                       
Table no. 2 Social spending as percentage of GDP                       
Country 1975 1985 1995 2000 2004 2006
Czech Rep. - - - 19.5 19.6 18.7
Germany 27.8 25.8 32.5 29.2 29.5 28.7(p)
Ireland 22.0 25.6 24.1 14.1 17.0 18.2
Greece 10.0 19.5 23.6 25.7 26.0 24.2
Spain 16.2 24.8 26.3 19.7 20.0 20.9(p)
France 26.3 34.2 35.9 29.5 31.2 31.1(p)
Italy 20.6 26.7 28.2 24.7 26.1 26.6(p)
Lithuania - - - 15.8 13.3 13.2(p)
Hungary - - - 19.3 20.7 22.3
Holland 29.3 30.7 32.4 26.4 28.5 29.3(p)
Poland - - - 19.5 20.0 19.2
Portugal - - 23.7 21.7 24.9 25.4
Romania - - - 13.2 14.9 14
Slovenia - - - 24.9 24.3 22.8(p)
Sweden 27.4 32.0 39.6 30.7 32.9 30.7(p)
UK 20.9 27.1 27.1 26.3 26.4(p)
UE-15 - - - 26.9 27.6 27.5(p)
UE-25 - - - 26.6 27.3 27(p)
UE-27 - - - - - 26.9(p)
      Source: [Eurostat-Esspros] 
The first remark we have is one of a methodological nature, the absence of spending on 
education in social spending. This spending meant a percentage of 5.2% on GDP in 2004 in 
UE-15 as well as in UE-27, although Member States present an important dispersion in this 
sense. In this way, Sweden has a 7.5% of spending in contrast to Greece, 3.9% or Spain 
4.3%.  
If we stand by the table we can see a growing trend of social spending until the middle 
of the 90’s, except from Ireland. From this moment the trend changes with a generalized fall 
until the year 2000 in which a new turning point upwards takes place until 2004. Between 
2004 and 2006 a light fall takes place, although diversity in performance is significant. In 
this way, Ireland (which is 9 points under the EU-27 average); Spain (almost 6 points); Italy 
(on the average), Hungary (almost 5 points); Holland (clearly above the average) and Por-
tugal (a little under the average) alter the general rule. All these countries show a light 
increase of social spending between 2004 and 2006. This fact allows us to point out other 
feature which is the strong dispersion of data between countries. The great difference be-
tween the 30.7% of Sweden and the 13.2% of Lithuania should reflect the current social 
model in those countries, which dismisses an easy conception of the European social model, 
especially in the new Europe. 
We should add other typologies to the four models pointed out by Boeri and Sapir, as 
other newer emerge showing, although vaguely, common features that will enable the for-
mation of other explicative models of the different socioeconomic realities currently in 
Europe. It is also important to say that according to data from 2004 social protection spend-
ing had probably grown under the GDP (Eurostat, 2007a). In general, social protection 
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spending as percentage of the GDP has been stable since 2003 (Eurostat 2008) both for UE-
15 and UE-25. 
 
3.3.1.1. Social Protection Spending per Head in Purchasing Power Parity (2006) 
The third table shows a new vector to bring us close to those features that can be of 
help understanding, from a quantitative point of view the European social model concept. 
The data on the table offer a precise comparison as social protection spending is presented 
per head purchasing power parity.  
 
Table no. 3 Social protection spending in PPP per head (2006) 
HOLLAND 9099.4 (p) 143
SWEDEN 8997.5 (p) 142
FRANCE 8199.8 (p) 129
GERMANY 7705.8 (p) 121
UK 7410.3 (p) 117
UE-15 7277.6 (p) 115
UE-25 6629.7 (p) 104
ITALY 6476.3 (p) 102
UE-27 6349 (p) 100
IRELAND 6320.7 100
GREECE 5525.2 87
SPAIN 5162.7 (p) 81
SLOVENIA 4792.9 (p) 75
PORTUGAL 4450.6 70
CZECH REP. 3439.3 54
HUNGARY 3400.6 (p) 54
POLAND 2373.1 37
LITHUANIA 1770 (p) 27
ROMANIA 1277 20
 
Source: [Eurostat-Esspros] 
We can see again a large dispersion of data: Holland has the highest spending, seven 
times higher than Romania’s, the lowest. It would be really difficult to get round this reality 
and speak openly of a European social model, formed by equivalent social protection sys-
tems. We will see that it is more about sharing values than sharing properly financed 
institutional designs to meet population’s needs. Although a Romanian and a Dutch can 
share some values, their citizen’s rights are completely different. 
 
3.3.1.3. Social Spending by Functions (2006)  
We have already said that education spending is not on the statistics relating to social 
spending. The fourth table shows the per cent allocation, by functions of the total social 
spending, corresponding to 2006. We can see how the weight of the spending in old age and 
survival pensions is the most important in all countries, except Ireland. We find again dis-
persion on the values although a bit more nuanced, having excluded Ireland’s for being 
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oddly low and those of Poland and Italy for being oddly high, the distance between the 
highest, Greece (51.3%) and the lowest, Sweden  (40.2%) is a bit more than eleven points. 
 
Table no. 4 Social spending by function (% total social spending) (2006) 
Country Old age/survival illness/Health Disability Family/Childhood
Unemplyme
nt
Housing/social 
excl.
Czech Rep 43.2 34.4 8.6 7.6 3.2 3.1
Germany 44.3 (p) 29.1 (p) 6.2 (p) 11.1 (p) 6.3 (p) 2.9 (p)
Ireland 27.4 41.1 5.4 14.7 7.6 3.9
Greece 51.3 28.7 4.7 6.2 4.3 4.5
Spain 41.3 (p) 31.2 (p) 7.3 (p) 5.7 (p) 12.5 (p) 2.0 (p)
France 44.3 (p) 29.9 (p) 6.1 (p) 8.6 (p) 6.9 (p) 4.3 (p)
Italy 60.5 (p) 26.8 (p) 5.9 (p) 4.5 (p) 2.0 (p) 0.3 (p)
Lithuania 44.8 (p) 32.1 (p) 10.7 (p) 9.0 (p) 1.9 (p) 1.6 (p)
Hungary 42.2 29 9.6 13 3.1 3.0
Holland 41.4 (p) 31.8 (p) 8.5 (p) 5.8 (p) 5.0 (p) 7.5 (p)
Poland 61.1 20.4 9.3 4.4 3.0 1.8
Portugal 49.1 29.2 10 5.1 5.5 1.1
Slovenia 45.4 (p) 32.1 (p) 8.5 (p) 8.6 (p) 3.0 (p) 2.5 (p)
Sweden 40.2 (p) 26 (p) 14.9 (p) 9.8 (p) 5.5 (p) 3.6 (p)
UK 44.7 (p) 31.8 (p) 8.7 (p) 6.1 (p) 2.4 (p) 6.3 (p)
Romania 45.0 34.8 7.4 8.9 2.7 1.2
UE-15 46.0 29.3 (p) 7.4 (p) 8.0 (p) 5.7 (p) 3.6 (p)
UE-27 46.2 (p) 29.2 (p) 7.5 (p) 8.0 (p) 5.6 (p) 3.6 (p)
Source: [Eurostat-Esspros] 
After the spending in pensions, next biggest chapter is health. In this case Ireland clear-
ly exceeds the European average (29.2%) with 41.1% and Poland has the lowest percentage 
20.4%. We have to highlight that the sum of the two most important chapters, pensions and 
health, amounts to ca. 75% of total social spending, which makes clear that their importance 
as key elements on the European Welfare States.  
Spending in social protection of disabled people and family tends to be around 16% 
average, 8% each one, but data show again large distance ones from the others.  In the case 
of disabled allowances Sweden is a clear outlier 14.9%. In the case of family allowances 
policies some countries stand out as Ireland (14.7%), Germany (11.1%) and some new EU 
members as Hungary (13%) and Romania (8.9%).  It is also important to mention the mea-
gre weight of familiar policy in Spain (5.7%), Italy (4.5%) or Poland (4.4%) all of them with 
a strong catholic tradition.  
Unemployment allowances reach an average of 5.5% in the UE-27, standing out 
Spain’s data (12.5%) and Lithuania (1.9%), the lowest of those on the table. We do not find 
convergence here either, although maybe employment policies have achieved a better coor-
dination in the European Union.  
 
3.3.1.4. The Financing of Systems of Social Protection (2006) 
As we can see on Table 5, the two main sources of social protection systems are state 
subsidies and social taxes, whether from employers or from employees. Dispersion of data is 
again the main feature. In this way, state subsidies go from 53.2% in Ireland to 19.6% of 
Romania and 18.8% in the Czech Republic. As it always happen when we use averages, es-
pecially when we talk about UE-27, they say little or hide the reality they try to summarize 
in a single data. As it was expected the low state contributions correlate with a high share of 
social contribution in financing.  
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Table no. 5 Financing of social protection systems (2006) 
País CONTRIBUCIÓN DEL ESTADO
CONTRIBUCIONE
S SOCIALES EMPLEADORES PROTEGIDOS
OTRAS 
CONTRIBUCIONE
S
R. Checa 18.8 80.7 53.9 26.4 0.9
Alemania 35.3 (p) 62.7 (p) 35.3 (p) 27.8(p) 1.6 (p)
Irlanda 53.2 40.0 26.2 15.5 5.0
Grecia 31.4 58.4 35.1 22.6 10.9
España 33.9 (p) 64.5 (p) 48.5 (p) 15.4 (p) 2.2 (p)
Francia 30.6 (p) 65.6 (p) 44.7 (p) 20.9 (p) 4.2 (p)
Italia 41.9 (p) 57.0 (p) 41.3 (p) 15.1 (p) 1.6 (p)
Lituania 38.5 (p) 59.9 (p) 54.9 (p) 6.1 (p) 0.5 (p)
Hungría 40.6 57.9 38.6 15.2 5.7
Holanda 20.1 (p) 67.9 (p) 31.8 (p) 37.7 (p) 10.4 (p)
Polonia 33.3 50.4 25.9 22.0 18.8
Portugal 44.1 47.5 30.8 14.5 10.6
Eslovenia 30.7 (p) 67.4 (p) 27.1 (p) 40.8 (p) 1.4 (p)
Suecia 48.9 (p) 49.8 (p) 39.9 (p) 8.9 (p) 2.4 (p)
Reino Unido 50.4 (p) 47.9 (p) 34.2 (p) 13.7 (p) 1.7 (p)
Rumania 19.6 73.3 56.3 13.2 10.8
UE-15 38.0 (p) 58.9 (p) 38.3 (p) 20.7( p) 3.2 (p)
UE-27 37.6 (p) 59.0 (p) 38.2 (p) 20.6 (p) 3.5 (p)
Source: [Eurostat-Esspros] 
The fact that social contributions come from two different sources determines once 
again a mixed range of combinations. The contribution is shared out in a very unequal way 
among Member States. In the case of Lithuania the 60% is shared out by 54% employers 
and a 6% employees. The only constant fact, with the exception of Holland and Slovenia, is 
that employer contributions is higher. In the case of Sweden, so paradigmatic in social poli-
cies the sharing the sharing of 48,9% social contribution is (39.9% employers and 8.9% 
employees). Other contributions are just 2.4%. 
 
3.3.2. The European Social Model as an Ideal One 
From what has already been said we can conclude that the concept of European social 
model presents some difficulties to capture the reality of social protection systems in the 
Member States of the European Union, even more in the face of the enlargement to 27 coun-
tries at the beginning of 2007. Why then is it so much interest in keeping the debate about 
the concept and outlining its main features?  
We are in front of the paradigm of a model to follow in order to combine economic ef-
ficiency and social justice (Ferrera et al., 2000; Esping-Andersen, 1999) in the most suitable 
way. If we come back to the scheme proposed by Sapir (2005) in the first table, we should 
wonder if we had to identify the Nordic model as the ideal one, as it couples high efficiency 
with equity and offers a universal system of social security, a fair distribution of income and 
salaries, an efficient collective bargaining mechanism and a high investment in education 
and research and development (R&D). 
It is paradoxical that the documents which outline the long term European Union’s 
strategy, as those with the objectives of the Lisbon Strategy, have the United States as a ref-
erence instead of the countries of the EU which have already achieved the objectives all 
member states are after to, even when a comparison with the United States is completely in-
appropriate, because of cultural and economic policy reasons. I will shortly describe three of 
them. First of all the diverse role of the European Union as an institution versus the Federal 
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Government, as it has an executive budget of 20% of GDP in the face of the EU with just a 
1,1%. This reality makes clear the capacity of political action from one and other govern-
ments.  
Secondly there is another important divergent element in the objectives pursued by two 
basic institutions: the Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank. In the case of the lat-
er, their only concern is the control of inflation, concentrating their efforts in this variable, 
while the Federal Reserve tries to accompany the government’s economic policy, in the pur-
suit of growth, not ignoring the search of price stability.  
A third distinctive element is the existence of a Stability and Growing Pact in the EU, 
which sets restrictions to imbalances as the limit of 3% of GDP for public deficit and 60% 
of GDP for public debt. 
 
3.3.3. The European Social Model as a Group of Values and Common Features 
We have to find a group of values and common features to help us identifying a sty-
lized European social model, from which we could outline different sub-models to explain 
the wide social and cultural diversity, which is one of the important features of the European 
reality. 
 
3.3.3.1. Europe’s Main Features  
Jürgen Habermas (2006, p. 50) says that during the second half of the twentieth cen-
tury the Europe on the west side of the Iron Curtain has been developing some recognizable 
features of a common political mind. In this way the rest of the world notices a European 
and not a German or French. Habermas states eight main features: 
a) Secularization. Citizens contemplate with suspicion interferences between politics 
and religion.  
b) Some confidence is given to state organizational and management capacities.  
c) That implies certain scepticism as a third feature. Not a refusal to market role, 
whose mistakes should be corrected through political initiative; 
d) A very strong feeling to what Habermas calls Dialectic of Enlightenment;  
e) although the European understands that technical progress is a key element of eco-
nomic growth and therefore welfare does not keep unbreakable optimistic expectations in 
relation to that progress. 
f) Europe has demonstrated a clear preference for security guarantees that the Welfare 
State provides and social cohesion regulations.  
g) tolerance to violence against people is relatively low. 
h) Europe has expressed a wish to have a multilateral and international order legally 
regulated. This international order would be associated to the hope of establishing an effi-
cient worldwide policy in a reformed United Nations framework.  
  
3.3.3.2. Common Values 
These European features highlighted by Habermas can be summarized in four common 
values present in all social assistance and protection systems, social dialogue and labour 
market. These values are: Freedom, Democracy, Equality and Solidarity.  
From these defining features and values that inspire its social dimension, Europe has 
established some political goals as reduction of poverty and social exclusion, improvement 
of equality in income distribution, promotion of equal opportunities and establishment of as-
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sistance systems able to provide support in order to protect citizens faced with any social 
eventuality.  
 
3.3.3.3. Current Features of the Social Model in the European Union. The Social 
Model as European Political Project. 
 
The European Commission (2005) stated it considers the basic features of current so-
cial models in the EU. They can be grouped into five fields: 
a) Policies are based on solidarity values, cohesion, equal opportunities and fight 
against discrimination. 
b) Security and health at work policies, universal access to education and health care, 
quality of life and employment quality, sustainable development and ways for civil society 
participation are incorporated.   
c) An important public sector. 
d) Enhancement of national systems, at a supra national level, through EU interven-
tion.  
e) Important tradition of social dialogue and establishment of agreements between 
governments, trade unions and industry.  
We previously said that the consolidation of the European social model as an essential 
element of the European soul has as fundamental goal the promotion of both sustainable 
economic growing and social cohesion. Different landmarks have taken place in the recent 
history of Europe having set up a political challenge which has recently lost some strength. 
We could highlight in this sense the EU council (or Summit?) of Barcelona in March 2002 
where it was stated that the European model is based on good economics, a high level of so-
cial protection and education and social dialogue.  
The European Council of Brussels in March 2004 stated in a similar way some terms 
that would be reproduced at the European social Agenda, emanated from the European 
Council of March 2005. It was about achieving a better level and quality of life through 
strong economic growth, employment creation, social cohesion and environment protection.   
In the same line the informal European Council celebrated on 27th October 2005 in 
Hampton Court (Great Britain) highlighted the European dimension of social policies and 
the common objective of moving towards social justice through a higher economic growth, 
more employment creation and more flexible social systems.  
In July 2008 the European Commission presented a Paper which represents a renova-
tion of the Social Agenda: “Renewed social agenda: Opportunities, access and solidarity in 
21st century Europe”. This is a key document to understand the main action lines in the so-
cial field in Europe. In this sense the document makes it clear on its 3rd page; actions on the 
social field are first of all Member States’ responsibility, specifying limits to EU’s power on 
this field.   
It is said that this renewed Agenda shouldn’t be limited to traditional domains. It 
should be transverse and multidimensional, meeting a wide range of fields from labour mar-
ket policies to education, health, immigration and intercultural dialogue.  
The renewed social Agenda established on the Paper is shaped by three concepts: op-
portunities, access and solidarity. It is said then that the creation of opportunities requires a 
constant effort to create more and better jobs and to increase welfare.    
That means taking barriers down, making mobility easier, fighting against discrimina-
tion, strengthen gender equality, helping families and avoiding new ways of social 
exclusion. Individuals need access to exploit opportunities; access to education, health care 
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and general interest social services. They should be able to participate and actively integrate 
themselves in the societies they live. But there are also individuals and regions in Europe 
that kept out of changes and need some help. This is why solidarity is so important, as it is 
against poverty and social exclusion.   
 
4. SOCIAL EUROPE AND THE CHALLENGE OF GLOBALIZATION 
In a joint survey of the European Commission and the Centre for European Policy Stu-
dies (CEPS), March 2008, Begg, Draxles and Mortensen (2008) state that globalization is 
rather an opportunity for growth than a social threat, although the process may produce win-
ners and losers with severe social results. 
They point out the empirical evidence, which we have analyzed in the point 3.3.1., that 
no demolition of the European social model – institutionally established in the welfare states 
– has ever happened. It is said the idea that only a free market, putting aside the social agen-
da, is consistent with sustained prosperity is openly wrong. The EU has small open 
economies in which high levels of prosperity have been possible also due to large and lavish 
welfare states. 
The survey we are talking about states that globalization is not a zero-sum game. How-
ever, it is necessary to point out three issues with the purpose of assessing its benefits and 
impact: 
a. The benefits are no evenly distributed between individuals, regions and coun-
tries. 
b. The costs will probably concentrate in the short term while the benefits will 
materialize in the long term. As result, the pace of the process is part of the po-
litical challenge. 
c. The benefits won’t happen automatically but will result from successful adap-
tation policies; i.e. from reforms in the fields of competitiveness, social 
regulation, education, research and infra-structures. 
Other to be checked put into the Commission survey is that globalization carries out 
unavoidable adverse consequences. Europeans have pointed out a number of potential 
threats actually: redistributive impacts, with negative results for some groups and regions; 
cultural hegemony; environmental damages; political conflicts; instability of public fin-
ances; social unrest related to immigration. 
In any case those adverse consequences must be nuanced as, at the same time, external 
positive effects may arise from an increased real income as a result of cheaper imports. Al-
so, the strain on the social budget as a result of the ageing of population would be more 
intense than those coming from globalization. 
The challenges brought about by globalization can be classified into three main groups 
(Begg et al. 2008, p.3): 
a. Equipping the economy to compete. It means to invest in activities with a future 
and to adapt the EU economy to the requirements regarding climate change, the 
ageing of population and new competition fronts. 
b. Carrying out adjustments. Economic and social shifts will be necessary bringing 
about costs and demanding a different resource allocation. 
c. Improving socioeconomic governance. This will require a joint action of the EU 
and its member states. 
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The Lisbon Strategy is a response to globalization. Its main goal is to re-accommodate 
the EU in the world arena. However, it is necessary to clarify that this Strategy has also oth-
er key goals as job creation and the assurance of social cohesion. 
The Lisbon Strategy intended to growth and employment must be coupled with effec-
tive policies to protect the losers of globalization. We mean the policies of skill recycling 
and other active policies purported to worker re-adaptation. In any case, for those not cov-
ered by these measures, it will be necessary to implement modern solidarity policiesii. 
It has been reiterated, and thus confirmed by the Renewed Agenda on Social Policy, 
that this is basically a competence of the member states. However, the easiness to carry out 
the needed adjustments and reforms will be given by the measure in which the member 
states are able to co-operate both within the EU and in wider fora, with the purpose to avoid 
a race to the bottom in the environment and social arenas. 
Begg et al. (2008, p.4) warn that a fragmentary regulation and the prevalence of na-
tional regulations may become a zero-sum game, and even a negative one. On the contrary, 
an effective coordination process at a EU scale may help to overcome the lack of global 
trust and reduce that risk. To summarise, the challenge of governance within the EU is to as-
sure that the current processes (Lisbon; Sustainable Development Strategy; Open Method 
for the Coordination of the Protection and Social Inclusion) are suitable and acceptable for 
the member states and do no generate any conflict in their goals and guidelines. 
May wish to conclude this point with an idea I think is crucial: globalization is not the 
only reason for the reorientation or reinvention of the welfare state. 
To face globalization is just one of the reasons for the needed reorientation on the wel-
fare state and it should go beyond the compensation to those who are supporting the most 
the cost of the increasing global competition. According to Begg et al. (2008, p.5) the core 
of the responses in social policy issues would be in: education and training, immigration and 
integration policies, labour market reforms and the redesign of social protection to enhance 
its activating role. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
Modern society is the result of a long and successful process that brought it to the insti-
tutional configuration we dubbed in this work welfare state. This process reached its highest 
point in the Europe articulated into the EEC, in the beginning of the 1970s. 
In this space and time, the welfare state showed some features that inspired trust: full 
employment, lavish social services and universal and public, and control of poverty and 
marginalization.  
From the crisis of the 1970s some very diverse transformations took place that finally 
eroded the foundations of the welfare state representing a fire test its main elements. In the 
background of this process of critique lays a severe intellectual turnaround in which “the 
main socializing structures lose their authority, the main ideologies are not longer their ve-
hicle, the historical process don’t mobilize any more, the social ground is already no more 
than the extension of private life” (Charles, 2007, pp.23-24). This age of vacuum or hyper-
modernity (Lipovetsky, 2007) or liquid modernity (Bauman, 2006), is the economical a 
background of turn back to liberalism, in a historic track both in thought and in the praxis, 
risky and unable to improve the achievements of modern times, those of the golden age of 
growth, in the middle on the 20th century.   
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In the panoramic view of the European social model offered in this work, we have 
been able to see how the historic process has been unable to foster the convergence of the 
social systems of the EU-27, meanwhile it continues enlarging its borders. 
The current European political process seems to have put the social dimension in a 
secondary place, after a peak point in 2005, and after overcoming a paralyzing institutional 
crisis in 2007. Probably we may point out in the social ground the impulse of the concept of 
flexsecurityiii one that should inspire member states’ future employment policies, an acrobat-
ic exercise – both in the linguistic and in the political sense –for a like-minded executive and 
community political atmosphere. 
Also, it must be pointed out the impulse in the social field of the EC Communication, 
July 2008, for the establishment of a Renewed Social Agenda one – as we have stated – be-
ing built on the basis of three concepts: opportunity, access and solidarity. 
Europe as a homogeneous entity, is something unthinkable beyond the values ex-
pressed by Habermas which date back to the 18th century Enlightenment. Even thus, we can 
build a dream generating project requiring high doses of generosity both political and intel-
lectual, in a time in which they are not values on the raise. 
In the end of the work we have outlined the challenges facing the model in its current 
version, with the aim of preserving its most significant and identity features. Sebastien 
Charles (2007, p.30) expressed the uneasiness of hyper-modern man, a Narcissus living 
tormented by that worrying: 
In the international level terrorism and catastrophes, neoliberal logic and its effects on 
employment; in the local one, urban pollution, violence in marginalized neighbourhoods; in 
a personal level anything that weaken body and psychic balance. 
Before this reality it is needed a theoretical and smoothing speech. This is, as we know, 
the demanding endeavour of social scientist, to it we must devote ourselves. The possibility 
of enjoy civilization and life is at stake. 
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